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Resumen: el artículo examina la evolución de la regulación de la banca en la 
UE tras la crisis financiera global de 2008. Propone analizar el sector como 
un campo de acción estratégico, incrustado en una red de campos en que los 
agentes difieren en su poder y capacidad de influencia. El análisis se centra en 
dos políticas implementadas bajo la nueva regulación europea, la limitación de 
la remuneración variable y la introducción de cuotas de diversidad. Sigue el 
mecanismo de elaboración de políticas, desde la discusión científica acerca de si 
estas medidas mejoran el rendimiento de las organizaciones hasta la adopción 
de políticas de políticas que encierran todas las controversias en una caja negra. 
Esta indagación, aunque modesta, sugiere que se podría obtener un mejor 
conocimiento de la regulación bancaria a través de un enfoque que combine la 
teoría de los campos de acción estratégico y los estudios sociales de la ciencia. 
Palabras clave: gobierno corporativo, estudios sociales de la ciencia, Unión 
Europea, crisis financiera de 2008. 
Abstract: This paper examines the evolution of the regulation of the banking 
industry in the EU after the global financial crisis of 2008. It proposes to 
analyze the sector as a strategic action field, embedded in a web of fields and 
where participants differ in their power and influence. The analysis focuses on 
two policies implemented under the new European regulation: the limitation 
of variable remuneration and the introduction of diversity quotas. It uses ideas 
developed by Social Studies of Science (SSS) to monitor the policy-making 
30 31RIO, Nº 15, 2015
Manuel Ángel Santana Turégano
mechanism, from the scientific discussion about whether these measures 
improve the performance of organizations to the adoption of policies that close 
all controversies in a black box. This inquiry, albeit modest, suggests that a 
deeper understanding of the regulation of the banking industry could be gained 
by following an approach that combines Strategic Action Fields Theory and 
Social Studies of Science.  
Key Words: corporate governance, social studies of science, European Union, 
2008 financial crisis.
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1. Introduction
Since the global financial crisis of 2008-8 the strategic field of the banking 
industry has experienced major upheavals. In the year 2013 a new regulation of 
the European sector was enacted, consisting of Directive 2013/36/EU “on access 
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions” and Regulation 575/2013, which develops it. The whole package 
has become known as the CRDIV (The Fourth Capital Requirement Directive) 
and introduces important changes in the rules governing the field, especially in 
the realm of corporate governance of banks. How are banks organized? What 
are the social causes and consequences of the changes in the organization of 
banks? These are the issues that this paper will deal with, bearing in mind that 
finance in modern societies is no longer an individual field but a transversal 
domain that impacts on each and every aspect of society, to the extent that it has 
become common to speak about the financialization of society. The institutional 
regulation of any given economic sector is a key issue that strongly influences 
how the sector, and any specific firm within it, is organized. The specificity of the 
banking sector is that, given the key role it plays in modern economies, it is more 
tightly regulated than others. Therefore, to a great extent, the organization of the 
banking sector is the result of institutional regulation, not only a matter of hard, 
objective economic performance but also of soft, subjective, social equilibria. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of how the banking 
regulation in the EU can be studied using strategic action fields. These 
can be defined as “a meso-level social order where actors (…) interact with 
knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about 
the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (…), and the field’s 
rules” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011:3). The boundaries of any field are not 
fixed, but can change depending on the definition of the situation and 
the issues at stake (the “banking industry” might or might not include 
saving unions and insurance companies depending on the definition of 
the situation). Any strategic action field (SAF) includes incumbents, 
challengers and governance units. Incumbents are “actors who wield 
disproportionate influence within a field and whose interests and views 
tend to be heavily reflected in the dominant organization of the Strategic 
Action Field (SAF)” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011:5). As we will see, the 
present regulation of the banking industry reflects the strong influence 
that some actors have over it. Challengers, on the other hand, are those 
actors who occupy less privileged positions, but who nevertheless conform 
to the prevailing order, taking what the system gives them and awaiting 
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new opportunities to challenge the structure and logic of the system. And 
governance units are the institutions charged with ensuring that the rules 
of the field are respected. The banking industry has manifold governance 
units at both the global level (Basel Agreement), the European Level 
(European Banking Authority, European Central Bank and others) and 
the member states’ level (central banks). This is the case because fields 
are embedded in complex webs of other fields. At the micro level each 
individual bank is composed of several branches, and each branch of several 
departments or individuals. At the macro level, the banking industry of 
a country is made up of several banks, and at higher levels, such as the 
European Union, the banking industry is a strategic field comprising the 
sub-strategic fields of each country. The relationships between fields can 
be characterized as proximate-distant, vertical-horizontal and state-non 
state. Proximate fields are those with recurrent ties and whose actions 
routinely impact on each other, whilst distant fields are those with very few 
ties and whose action barely impact on the other. When relations between 
fields are vertical it means that one field exercises formal authority over the 
other. For instance, the European Union issues guidelines for the banking 
industry which member states’ regulations must abide by. A horizontal 
relation between fields means that neither of them exercises formal 
authority but they mutually depend upon each other (for instance, the 
relationship between the central banks of France and Germany). Finally, 
as for the state-non state distinction it is important to bear in mind that 
“States (for us) are themselves dense collections of fields, whose relations 
can be described as either distant or proximate and, if proximate, can be 
characterized by horizontal or vertical links (…) on closer inspection 
states contain myriad social orders whose relations can be as conflictual 
and constraining as any other fields” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011:8). As 
we will see, this is specially the case for the banking industry: only the state 
has the ability to intervene and regulate. But “the State”, in the case analyzed 
here, comprises several vertical levels (the EU, the member states), several 
horizontal levels (at the EU level several directorate generals can intervene 
in the banking industry) and the relations between all of them are usually 
conflictual. 
Banking regulation is a phenomenon with two facets. On the one hand, 
it is a techno-scientific artefact. By applying the latest “scientific” advances 
in economics and finance, legislators try to produce a device that allows 
governments to control and monitor the behaviour of economic actors. 
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From this point of view, an institutional regulation is an attempt to channel 
the course of events in such a way that political ends can be met. As clearly 
stated in the CRDIV the regulation of the banking sector in the EU aims 
to promote stronger financial entities and markets, and, ultimately, to 
enhance the economic well-being of the population. On the other hand, 
the regulation of a sector is also a problem of social equilibrium. As the 
Social Studies of Science (SSS) literature shows, technologies always 
occur in a given social milieu. Following the ideas posited by Latour 
(1992), before a scientific controversy is closed and turned into a black 
box upon which future scientists will base their work, fierce debates are 
held. Institutional regulation is always the product of social and political 
struggles, even when it is based mainly on expert knowledge provided 
by experts. The regulation of the banking industry has been reformed 
after the global financial crisis, with the implicit rationale that accurate 
knowledge of the causes of the crisis would permit policies to be designed 
to provide solutions and prevent future crises from occurring, or at least 
to limit their impact. This process started with the “De Larosière Report” 
(2009), continued with the creation of the European System of Financial 
Supervision in 2011, and in 2013 the CRDIV Directive was enacted. 
According to the diagnosis provided in the former directive, weaknesses 
in corporate governance contributed widely to the crisis. Bank managers 
had the wrong incentives and made risky decisions that contributed to 
the global financial and economic crisis. Therefore, the new legislation 
aims to impose certain conditions on the corporate governance of banks. 
Consequently, the current legislation (CRDIV, 2013/36/EU) includes 
a whole sub-sector (3) on governance. To exemplify how the banking 
industry might be studied using the strategic action approach, this paper 
will focus on the mechanisms that resulted in two controversial policies 
being implemented in the new legislation: diversity quotas and the State 
regulation of executives’ remuneration policies. From the point of view of 
the policy-making mechanisms the paper will provide an overview of how 
banking is regulated in the EU. From the point of view of Social Studies 
of Science, the paper will try to shed some light on how such controversial 
issues as “What is the best way to govern a bank/an enterprise”, which 
could require hundreds of pages of academic study are summarized in one-
line policy prescriptions such as “banks should establish gender quotas in 
their boards.” Current legislation has been heavily criticized, and questions 
have been raised about whether it will do the sector any good (Masera, 
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2014; Stiglbauer & Velte, 2015) and it has even been referred to as “quack 
corporate governance” (Enriques & Zetsche, 2015), implying that it was 
mainly enacted “for the sake of doing something”. The paper will proceed 
as follows. First, an overview of the governance of the strategic action field 
of the banking industry will be provided, mainly at the European level but 
also at the global and national level. Second, the policy-making mechanism 
that resulted in the introduction of the aforementioned policies will be 
briefly analyzed. The paper will then conclude by singling out promising 
lines of research on the banking industry from the field of strategic action. 
2. The institutional regulation of the banking industry 
in the EU
Understanding the banking industry as a strategic action field means realising 
that it is made up of several actors that know one other, and the purposes and 
rules of the field. The purpose of the field of the banking industry is to obtain 
an economic profit through the activities usually associated with financial 
entities. That is to say, lending money (mortgages, consumer credits, credits for 
entrepreneurs) accepting deposits and investing them, and providing financial 
services (credit cards, ATM, money transfers) for which they charge fees. As 
Masera (2014) stresses, the banking industry of the European Union is by far 
the world’s biggest. This is due to the fact that enterprises are financed through 
the stock market (firms sell bonds) to a much greater extent in the US than in the 
EU, where firms mainly resort to banks when in need of financing. The activity 
of banks has always been State-regulated, because banks create money through 
the cash reserve ratio and can have a big impact on the economy. The amount of 
money banks must keep and cannot lend is therefore the main determinant of their 
activity and of how much money they can earn. The salience of the activity of the 
banking industry for the global economy became clear after the oil crisis of 1973. 
Once the Bretton Woods Agreements had been dismantled, the bankruptcy of 
an important German bank (Bankhauss Herstatt) led to considerable upheaval 
in the financial system at the global level. In order to cope with the perils of 
financial instability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – BCBS) was 
created in 1974. Its main aim was to set a minimum on the requirements of 
capital banks should keep according to the risk they faced. It also issued general 
recommendations for the sound management of credit institutions, from then 
on known as “Basel I”. And these recommendations, though not binding, were 
mostly adapted to national legislations. Since the Basel Committee on Banking 
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Supervision was created several agreements have been entered into (Basel I, Basel 
II and, since 2010, Basel III) and the Basel Committee can be considered as the 
“Governance Unit” of the banking industry at the macro, global level, using the 
terms posited by Fligstein and MacAdam (2011, 2012)
For countries belonging to the European Union the banking industry 
is regulated mostly at the European level. Since its very beginning, one of 
the main objectives of the European Union (then known as the European 
Economic Community) was to promote the creation of a single market for 
all European countries. Therefore, though legislation has varied over time, 
the current situation is that the vast majority of the regulation (field rules, 
as it is referred to in the theory of fields) takes place at the European level, 
and the member states adapt and transpose the European Directive and 
Regulation to their national laws. For example, in Spain Law 10/2014, 
of June 26, on Financial Institutions (Ley 10/2014, de 26 de junio, 
de ordenación, supervision y solvencia de las entidades de crédito) and the 
Royal Decree 84/2015, of February 13, adapt the European regulation, 
enacted in 2013. Considering the interconnections between European 
economies it is not surprising that financial services are mainly regulated 
for at the European level, because any significant difference in the way 
they are regulated would lead to unfair competition between member 
states. As mentioned above the main corpus of banking regulation in 
the EU is the so called CRD IV, which consists of one directive and one 
regulation. The CRD IV can be considered an adaption of the general 
“rules of the field” provided at the global level in Basel III Agreements, the 
recommendations for the sound management of financial entities issued 
in 2010, after the global financial crisis. However, the European and US 
regulations on financial institutions differ substantially in several domains, 
even though they both stem from Basel III, since the agreement permits 
considerable leeway. As summarized in the Memo provided on-line by the 
European Commission, the main aspects that European legislation adds 
to the Basel III general guidelines are the following:1 1) Limitation of the 
variable component of the remuneration of risk takers (in order to avoid 
promoting excessive risk-taking by financial entities. 2) Introduction 
of  new rules governing risk management by boards 3) Introduction of 
diversity quotas in the boards of financial entities (in particular, gender) 
4) Enhanced transparency of the activities of financial institutions, in 
particular as regards profits, taxes and subsidies 5) Introduction of  buffers 
1 The Memo can be found at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-690_en.htm>.
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that enhance the percentage of cash financial institutions must keep to 
prevent bankruptcies from occurring. 
How is the financial sector actually regulated in the EU? Who are the 
stakeholders consulted when a new regulation is drafted and how is the 
process driven? Participation in European elections and politics is relatively 
low in all member states, because citizens generally perceive the European 
Commission (“Europe”) as a distant space of governance whose decisions 
do not interfere with everyday issues. Citizens tend to participate more in 
politics at the national level which, in turn, indirectly influences European 
policies. However, in the realm of finance, decisions that considerably 
influence everyday life are made in ways that remain obscure for the 
vast majority of standard European citizens. They might be extremely 
concerned about the interest rate and how it affects the monthly payment 
of their mortgages. Still, they have no idea how to influence the course of 
events. Therefore, we will now describe the process of policy making in 
Europe, specifically as regards banking regulation. 
In the European Union the board entrusted with the responsibility 
of proposing legislation (such as the banking regulation analyzed herein) 
is the European Commission. With almost 34,000 members of staff, 
it is based mostly in Brussels (with some members in Luxembourg), 
and divided into departments – 33 as of late 2015 – called “directorate 
generals” (DGs) which can be compared to similar bodies in most western 
democracies (ministries in France, Spain or Italy, or departments in 
the USA). The European Commission is directed by the commission 
president (similar to a prime minister) and by the 33 “commissioners” 
(comparable to ministers, the head of each directorate general), appointed 
and elected by the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, the two boards that form the legislature of the EU. The European 
Parliament, with 751 members is elected every five years on the basis of 
proportional representation. The plenary sessions are held in Brussels or 
Strasbourg and the administrative offices are in Luxemburg. The Council 
of the European Union, made up of 28 seats, represents the executive 
governments of the EU member states. The EU decision-making procedure 
involves the Commission having the initiative to propose new legislation. 
These proposals have to be approved by the European Parliament and the 
European Council. 
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In principle each DG is in charge of a specific policy area. However, it is 
not uncommon for directorates general to overlap. For instance, in the field 
analyzed here, this is the case of at least the Directorate General “Economic 
and Financial Affairs (ECFIN)”, and the Directorate General “Financial 
Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (FISMA)”. The 
functioning of the European Commission combines political and technical 
steering. The political director of each directorate is its commissioner. 
Each member state is entitled to one commissioner. For instance, the 
Frenchman Pierre Moscovici is, as of October 2015, the commissioner 
of the Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation 
and Customs, whilst the Jonathan Hill, from Britain, is the commissioner 
of the Directorate General of “Financial Stability, Financial Services and 
Capital Markets Union (FISMA)”. At every directorate general there is 
also a director general, who is its technical director (a civil servant). For 
the areas analyzed herein the Italian Marco Butti is the director general 
of ECFIN, and the Frenchman Olivier Guersent is the director general of 
FISMA. Each commissioner has a cabinet, consisting of several advisers, 
who focus on several policy areas. In a number of cases, deputy generals 
are in charge of several subareas. The policy mechanism of the European 
Union means that the European Commission proposes new legislation, 
but the European Parliament and Commission must debate and vote 
before it becomes law. 
3. A new banking regulation after the financial crisis 
Following the global financial crisis of 2008-2008, the European Union initiated 
a process to reform financial supervision, changing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC (‘the Capital Requirements Directive’ III) to prevent future crisis. 
The process started with the first meeting of the “High Level Group on Financial 
Supervision”, chaired by Jacques de Larosière,2 in Brussels in November 2008, 
still a period of great financial turmoil. The group presented the conclusions, 
known as “The De Laroisere Report”, in February 2009. The report was 
commissioned as a joint effort of the Directorate General of Economic and 
Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) and the Directorate General of Internal Market, 
2 A former French civil servant, he was managing director of the International Monetary Fund (1978-1995) 
and of the Banque de France (1987-1993). From 1993 to 1998 he was the president of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Since then he has been Chairman of the Strategic Committee of the French 
Treasury and Advisor to BNP Paribas. It is not surprising that one of the members of this High Level Group 
was Rainer Masera, an Italian ex minister and academic who published a paper in 2014 widely criticizing the 
new European Regulation. 
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and it was followed by a consultation process. The first round of consultations 
for interested parties started as early as March 2009 ( just a few weeks after the 
report had been submitted3). In May 2009 a Conference on a new supervisory 
architecture in Europe was held in Brussels. The European Commission made 
its first legislative proposals in September 2009. The first proposal was to set 
up a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which was voted by the European 
Parliament and adopted by the European Council in the following year. The 
legislative texts were published in December 2010. These led to the adoption of 
macro prudential oversight of financial institutions as the main approach to this 
key issue (for macro prudential supervision see, for instance, Borio, 2003, 2011). 
As a consequence of this legislation three boards were created, the European 
Banking Authority (EBA, based in London), the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA, based in Paris), and The European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA, based in Frankfurt). 
In February 2010 the European Commission launched a public 
consultation of stakeholders on changes in the Capital Requirement 
Directive, echoing the recommendations made by the G20 leaders in the 
summits held in London and Pittsburgh in 2009.4 A public hearing on this 
issue took place in Brussels in late April 2010. The following consultations 
concerned countercyclical buffers (October 2010) and counterparty 
credit risk (February 2011). Finally, in July 2011 as a joint effort by the 
Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) and 
the Directorate General of Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship 
and SMEs (GROW) the commission made a legislative proposal for a 
directive and a regulation of credit institutions.5 After some debate, in 
a Plenary Session of the European Parliament6 held in Strasbourg on 
16 April 2013 the new proposal was adopted, and became EU law, as 
Directive and Regulation, in June 2013.  
4. The institutional regulation of Corporate 
Governance: a black box?
3 The text of the consultation can be found at: <http://europa.eu//rapid/press-release_IP-09-373_
en.htm?locale=en>.
4 The consultation can be found at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-197_en.htm?locale=en>.
5 The process can be followed at: <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/regcapital/legislation-in-force/index_
en.htm>. 
6 The Debate can be followed at <http://news-europa.eu/economy-finance-tax/item/53088-plenary-session-
of-the-european-parliament-joint-debate-capital-requirements-directive-crd-iv-strasbourg-16-april-2013>. 
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According to the approach posited by Latour (1992) any technical or scientific 
controversy has two facets. Once a particular controversy has been solved 
it becomes “science”, and provides certainty, answers and the foundations on 
which to build technical devices and enhance knowledge. But if the very same 
controversy is observed before it has been solved, there is no clue as to what the 
final answer will be, and rather than answers science seems to produce only new 
questions. From this point of view the regulation of financial institutions can 
be seen as a matter of scientific controversy. As mentioned above, the CRD IV 
Directive deals with key issues such as “how to better organize the remuneration of 
the members of banks’ boards,” or “what were the causes of the recent global financial 
crisis” as questions suitable for finding an unequivocal answer (as in classical “hard 
sciences”). Since the number of issues covered in this Directive clearly surpasses 
the possibilities and scope of this paper, from this point on we shall focus on only 
two issues: the remuneration policies of boards and their composition. These are 
two of the main additions made by European Legislation to the Basel guidelines, 
as stated by the European Commission itself in its online memo.7 What were the 
causes of the recent global financial crisis? In several points of its preamble the 
CRD IV Directive clearly states: 
“(53) Weaknesses in corporate governance in a number of institutions 
have contributed to excessive and imprudent risk-taking in the banking sector 
which has led to the failure of individual institutions and systemic problems in 
Member States and globally”.
  “(60) The lack of monitoring by management bodies of management 
decisions is partly due to the phenomenon of groupthink. This phenomenon 
is, inter alia, caused by a lack of diversity in the composition of management 
bodies. To facilitate independent opinions and critical challenge, management 
bodies of institutions should therefore be sufficiently diverse as regards age, 
gender, geographical provenance and educational and professional background 
to present a variety of views and experiences (…)”
“(62) Remuneration policies which encourage excessive risk-taking behaviour 
can undermine sound and effective risk management of credit institutions 
and investment firms. (…) This Directive aims to implement international 
principles and standards at Union level by introducing an express obligation for 
credit institutions and investment firms to establish and maintain, for categories 
of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile 
of credit institutions and investment firms, remuneration policies and practices 
that are consistent with effective risk management (…).”
7 As mentioned above, see: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-690_en.htm>.
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“(65) (…) in order to avoid excessive risk taking, a maximum ratio between 
the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration should be set. 
It is appropriate to provide for a certain role for the shareholders, owners or 
members of institutions in that respect. Member States should be able to set 
stricter requirements as regards the relationship between the fixed and the 
variable components of the total remuneration. (…)” 
“(66) In order to ensure that the design of remuneration policies is integrated 
in the risk management of the institution, the management body should adopt 
and periodically review the remuneration policies in place. The provisions of 
this Directive on remuneration should reflect differences between different 
types of institutions in a proportionate manner, taking into account their size, 
internal organization and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities. In 
particular it would not be proportionate to require certain types of investment 
firms to comply with all of those principles”.
To sum all this up, the diagnosis provided in the Directive as regards 
the issues analyzed herein is that the global financial crisis (at least in 
its manifestation in Europe) had to do with 1) weaknesses in corporate 
governance 2) group thinking behaviours, caused by lack of diversity in 
the executive boards of financial institutions and 3) remuneration policies 
that encouraged unsound risk-taking. These solutions to the scientific 
controversy over what caused the crisis are now part of legislation enclosed 
in a black box (using Latour’s term). And it is from this diagnosis of the 
causes of the crisis that policies are designed to tackle them, and a whole 
subsection (3) is devoted to the governance of credit institutions. To 
prevent weaknesses in corporate governance causing future problems to 
the financial system, article 91 of the directive (Management body) states: 
“Members of the management body shall at all times be of sufficiently 
good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to 
perform their duties.8” And the task of issuing guidelines about what all 
this can mean is entrusted to the European Banking Agency (EBA). 
To cope with the problems of group thinking article 88 (Governance 
arrangements) says: “Member States shall ensure that the management 
body defines, oversees and is accountable for the implementation of the 
governance arrangements that ensure effective and prudent management 
of an institution (…) The nomination committee shall identify and 
recommend, for the approval of the management body (…) candidates to 
8 The full text of the Directive can be found on line at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013L0036&from=EN>. 
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fill management body vacancies, evaluate the balance of knowledge, skills, 
diversity and experience of the management body (…). Furthermore, the 
nomination committee shall decide on a target for the representation 
of the underrepresented gender in the management body and prepare a 
policy on how to increase the number of the underrepresented gender 
in the management body in order to meet that target. Finally, to tackle 
the problems caused by bad remuneration policies giving the wrong 
incentives, articles 92 (remuneration policies) and 94 (variable elements of 
the remuneration) set the bar. In particular, article 94 states: “For variable 
elements of remuneration, the following principles shall apply in addition 
to, and under the same conditions as, those set out in Article 92.” Point (g) 
of this article says: “Institutions shall set the appropriate ratios between 
the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration, whereby 
the following principles shall apply: (i) the variable component shall not 
exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each 
individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage.”
These are the answers the regulation (CRDIV) gives to the questions 
about what the causes of the crisis were and how credit institutions 
should be managed to improve their situations. But, to what extent are the 
answers that have been given to such thorny issues pristine and clear? On 
what basis has the “scientific” controversy been closed? If we look at the 
Commission proposal for a Directive issued in July 2011,9 which was the 
text taken as the basis for debate, some clues about the “scientific” method 
used to find the answers can be found. Point 1.2.2 of the explanatory 
memorandum says: “In its Communication of 4 March 2009 the European 
Commission announced that it would examine corporate governance rules 
and practice within financial institutions in the light of the financial crisis 
(…) In June 2010, the Commission published a Green Paper on corporate 
governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies and an 
accompanying staff working document which analyzed the deficiencies in 
corporate governance arrangements in the financial services industry and 
proposed possible ways forward. The results of this public consultation 
demonstrated a broad consensus on the deficiencies identified, receiving 
support from different public authorities and Member States.” How was 
this broad consensus reached? Point 2.1.2 of this proposal, on Corporate 
9 The full text of the proposal can be found on line at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52011PC0453&from=EN>. 
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Governance, provides the “methods” of the study that was carried out to 
answer these questions:
The initiative and impact assessment is the result of an extensive and continuous 
dialogue and consultation with all major stakeholders, including securities 
regulators, market participants (issuers, intermediaries and investors), and 
consumers. Questionnaires on their corporate governance practices were sent 
to a diverse cross-section of 10 major listed banks or insurance companies 
established in the EU. The questionnaires were augmented by 30 follow-up 
interviews with Board members, company secretaries, chief financial officers, 
chief risk officers, internal controllers. A questionnaire on their views and role 
regarding corporate governance of financial institutions was also sent to the 
European banking supervisors. Similarly, a cross-section of major European 
institutional investors and shareholders’ associations received a questionnaire 
on their practices and expectations regarding corporate governance of financial 
institutions. A follow-up meeting with about 30 investors was held on 2 
February 2010. The Green Paper finally launched a public consultation from 
2 June 2010 to 1st September 2010 on the possible ways forward to deal with 
failures in corporate governance in financial institutions. The responses and 
their analysis can be consulted on the Commission website
The transparency criteria implemented by the EU institutions implies 
that there is sufficient information available on-line about the various 
consultation processes that took place before the enactment of the new 
legislation. However, this brief overview of the actual “study method” 
would certainly make any academic in the fields of Organizational Theory 
or Sociology of Organizations blush. The “research method” used to 
define the “best practices” included a sample of only 10 major banks or 
insurance companies, and only 30 individuals were interviewed. It goes 
almost without saying that the views of these respondents have had a 
disproportionate effect on the final regulation as regards their share of 
the actual “population” of the European Banking Industry (in the debate 
held in the European Parliament in 2011 on this proposal it was stressed 
that at the time there were some 8,300 banks in the EU). The approach of 
the Social Studies of Science stresses that it is impossible to make a clear-
cut distinction about whether a controversy is only technical or whether 
it is political. From this point of view, we believe that a study of the 
banking regulation resulting from that approach seems most fruitful. As 
mentioned above, prior and post to the enactment of the legislation several 
academics have written papers that question the “conclusions” of this study 
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on which the legislation is based (see, for instance, Masera, 2014; Enriques 
and Zetsche, 2015; Stiglbauer and Velte, 2012, among others). But 
furthermore, leaving aside the “methodological” issues (the sample could 
be considered to be biased) the respondents in this study have some sort 
of connection to the institutions that carried it out. Therefore, according 
to the theory of fields, they can be considered to be “incumbents”. We will 
now proceed to make some remarks about the evolution of the banking 
regulation in the EU following this approach. 
The final result of the regulation of the banking industry can be better 
understood if we consider the industry as a strategic action field, which is 
itself made up of several strategic action fields. As a working hypothesis 
we propose analyzing the industry at three levels: global, European and 
national. Even though there are differences in power among the different 
actors, these differences are not static, and actors act strategically to 
improve their position within the field. According to the approach posited 
by Fligstein and McAdam (2011:7) this has to do with social skill: that is 
to say, how actors (in this case collective actors) frame their lines of action, 
mobilize people and use their cognitive capacity for reading people and 
environments. In this regard the recent evolution of the banking industry 
has been quite different in the various European Countries. For instance, 
in the case of Spain (see, for instance Santana Turégano and Rodríguez 
González, 2015), between the 1980s and 2005 the savings bank sector 
grew significantly, but has since then virtually disappeared. After the crisis 
of 2008 the Spanish financial system, formerly made up of around 45 
institutions was reduced to only 15 major banks. The evolution has been 
quite different for the French and German cases, where credit unions and 
savings banks have remained important.
The evolution of the banking industry in each Member State is of course 
embedded in the broader field. The evolution of European regulation has 
permitted major players in a country to carry out their activity in other 
countries, and therefore, according to the founding principles of the EU, 
the market for financial services has been at least partially unified. Under 
the current situation, the biggest banks (incumbents) operate in the vast 
majority of European markets, or at least in the main ones, in a variety of 
different ways.10 Some banks still remain important in their home markets 
10 For instance, in some cases a bank originally from one country is currently present in many countries of 
the UE under the same denomination ( Deuthsche Bank or Barclays, for example, are also present overseas). 
In other cases, the denomination of the banks varies slightly (for instance, the Spanish Banco de Santander is 
“Banco de Santander-Totta” in Portugal, and operates as “Santander” in the UK and similar brands in other 
European countries.)
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even though their presence in other countries is much smaller. The global 
financial crisis of 2008 can be considered an “episode of contention”, where 
field participants had a shared sense of uncertainty regarding the rules and 
power relations in the field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011:9). However, 
the mobilization has not been equal among incumbents and challengers, 
because the “rules of the fields” strongly favoured the major banks. The 
recent reconfiguration of the regulation of the banking industry has 
transferred much of the regulation from the national (Member States) to 
the EU level. The bigger banks, which were already present in the biggest 
markets in the EU, had a disproportionate influence on the regulation. 
As mentioned above, when the new legislation was drafted only 10 major 
banks out of the 8,300 banks in the UE were consulted. It is not surprising 
then that this period of crisis has been settled in a way in which the State, 
in this case the European Union, has been the focus in action (Fligstein 
and McAdam’s proposition 14 on settlement) and the field has been 
transformed in a such a way that only major banks can be competitive 
under the new rules of the field, as critics of the new regulation have 
pointed out (Enriques and Zetsche, 2015) 
5. Conclusions: a research agenda
The aim of this paper was to shed some light on the regulation of the obscure 
and opaque field of finance, traditionally a domain about which only the 
opinions of experts should be considered. We have pointed out how some of 
the controversies that have been “scientifically overcome” are in fact the result of 
social equilibria that may well change in the future. The debate in the European 
Parliament on the approval of the CRD IV gives some illustrative examples. 
Some Mr Bloom (European Freedom and Democracy, UK) considered the new 
legislation (CRDIV) to be “the triumph of hope over experience.” He considered 
that the situation was a flawed banking system, where bankers can lend money 
which they do not have, but that a great deal of regulation was the wrong type 
and that the real issues had not been solved with the proposed legislation.11” 
From this initial approach we believe two lines of research might prove fruitful, 
not only to advance knowledge about the banking industry but, at the theoretical 
level, to better understand how strategic action fields and expert-technocratic 
systems work. 
From the point of view of strategic action fields, this line of research 
could follow a long tradition of research that works with network analysis. 
11 The whole debate can be found at the aforementioned link. 
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As mentioned above, the process of reform of the European Regulation 
was initiated by a former International Monetary Fund president. The 
European Union provides significant information about the biography 
and CV of both political (commissioners) and technical (director general) 
positions. Therefore, the hypotheses that generally inform the public 
debate, such as the “revolving doors” and how “incumbents” are able to 
shape the rules of the fields in ways that best suit their interests, could be 
empirically proven (or not). To further enhance the knowledge of financial 
regulation using the theory of strategic action fields would require 
deepening the understanding of the social skills involved, the incumbents 
and challengers and the governance units. The CRD IV certainly laid 
down new rules that changed the social equilibria in the field. How can 
they shape the future world? Even though this paper can only add a very 
humble grain of sand to the vast task of finding what, in the tradition 
posited by Portes (1999), can be called “the hidden abode” – that is to say, 
how the hidden causes of social behaviour can be unveiled – we believe 
that these issues are the ones without which the Social Sciences could 
not accomplish their long standing tradition of helping to understand 
and shape the social world. We will now indicate what we think might be 
promising avenues for future research. 
According to Enriques and Zetsche (2015:240) three groups emerge 
as winners after the new regulation of the banking industry: consultants, 
politicians and policy makers, and bank supervisors. First, many of the 
new provisions will make it difficult for smaller banks to have the skills and 
experience required, and they will quite likely resort to external consultants 
to cope with the new demands. What social skills were involved in the 
process? Since much of the regulation is currently at the European Level, 
international consultancy firms with branches in different countries might 
become “incumbents”, since their capacity to influence the rules of the field 
have been enhanced. Second, another result of the new regulation, as 
pointed out by the authors mentioned above, is that politicians can now 
present themselves as having done a lot to restore trust and thus gain (or 
regain) public confidence. Finally, bank supervisors have gained a wide 
range of regulatory and supervisory power over bank boards, and a few 
individuals in a few strategic places can have such influence on individuals 
and institutions that they might be considered to be a “government at a 
distance” (Izquierdo, 2002). Taking all this into account, it seems that an 
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analysis of how these three actors with different roles are connected will 
be a fruitful line of research. 
From the point of view of the social studies of science, it is almost 
paradoxical that the very phenomenon that the regulation was trying to 
tackle (group thinking) might actually have informed the legislation. A 
quick review of the CVs shows that many of the significant players in the 
field have similar educational backgrounds. Therefore, consensus might 
not be so much a clear, unequivocal diagnosis of the causes of the crisis 
and its remedies but the result of shared common points of view. In a 
recent paper by Borio (2013), an author who is often regarded as one of 
the pioneers of the concept, stresses that the idea of “macro prudential 
regulation”, developed in the meetings of the International Bank of 
Settlements in the late 1970s, was for a long time only familiar to a small 
circle of cognoscenti and has lately become a common token in policy-
making. How are these types of consensus developed? 
As a consequence of the growing interest in financial regulation 
Wymeersch, Hopt and Ferrarini published a book on the issue in 2012 
(Wymeersch, Hopt, and Ferrarini, 2012). The experts’ opinion on the 
likely effect of the regulation (the scientific controversy) was quite negative. 
Winter’s analysis (Winter, 2012) indicated that it seemed difficult (if 
not impossible) to remedy governance problems in financial institutions 
through regulation. And more precisely, the idea that the financial crisis 
was a consequence of weaknesses in corporate governance Hopt (2012) 
stated that “whether failures in the corporate governance of banks were 
a major cause of the financial crisis is highly controversial”. How has 
this “scientific uncertainty” been turned into “policy making- certainty”? 
Black (2012) gives some insightful comments about why regulators are 
somehow allergic to publicly acknowledging the difficulty of making clear 
policies: “Regulators have to engage in processes of critical self-reflection 
if they are to learn, but in so doing they risk jeopardizing their claim to 
expert authority. Leaders and experts are expected to know the answers. 
To be constantly questioning what one is doing can look to outsiders as 
if one is trapped in self-doubt (…) Admitting to mistakes can therefore 
be self-undermining.” The traditional solution to this problem, as Black 
puts it, has been that regulators claim that they are simply implementing 
decisions made elsewhere. In this regard, the development of the whole 
body of European policies has provided considerable leeway for legislators 
at the European, national (member states) and infra national (regions) 
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levels. The claims to expert authority seem easier to maintain in a situation 
in which it is always possible to maintain publicly that policies are merely 
technical, the implementation of decisions made elsewhere on the basis 
of expert knowledge which always remain obscure. How scientific is the 
Economic Science on which many economic policies base their legitimacy? 
Regulation based upon “expert knowledge” is becoming more and more a 
key issue in many spheres of social life, not only in the domain of financial 
regulation, and not only in the European Union. From drug regulations 
to the management of the fiscal deficit, more and more decisions are being 
legitimized by resorting to “science”. Therefore, even though it goes well 
beyond the aims and scope of this brief enquiry, we believe that combining 
the theory of action fields and the social studies of science seems a fruitful 
and promising avenue to further enhance the knowledge of the complex 
social world in which we live.
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